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Editorial
– 4th MOX Consultation Response.
The UK Government’s Department of Environment, Transport
and the Regions and the Department of Health have launched the
4th public consultation exercise into whether or not
the newly built Sellafield MOX Plant should receive authorization
to begin operation.
Both nuclear
reprocessing plants at Sellafield and the ageing Wylfa nuclear
power plant on Angelsey remain shut down for safety reasons. But
BNFL is trying to make a comeback. They want Government permission
to start a new commercial-scale plutonium fuel (MOX) plant at
Sellafield. Help add to BNFL's woes by responding to the consultation.”Safe
Energy” opposes plutonium fuel (MOX) because:* MOX
is a "direct use" nuclear-weapons material that increases
the threat of nuclear proliferation wherever it is stored or transported
around the world
* using MOX in nuclear reactors is even more dangerous than using
ordinary nuclear fuel
* starting the MOX plant at Sellafield would produce new discharges
and plutonium-contaminated wastes which remain dangerous for thousands
of years.
* making MOX could be a first step to building new plutonium burning
reactors in the UK. Since BNFL's falsification of safety data
on its first shipment of MOX to Japan last year, evidence has
grown that there is no market for MOX worldwide. This means that
the taxpayer will pay the bill for cleaning up the wastes if the
new MOX plant is started up.
The Government received 361 responses to the 3rd consultation
exercise in 1999. So we need to top that to have any hope of preventing
this plant opening. Most of the responses were critical of the
Government's provisional view. In particular, an economic assessment
carried out by Mike Sadnicki, Fred Barker and Gordon MacKerron
for Friends of the Earth, concluded that the costs of operating
SMP would exceed the benefits. Since then the Government’s consultants, PA
Consulting reasserted the validity of the economic case. Sadnicki et al responded. They concluded,
yet again that the balance of argument is against economic justification
and that Ministers should have very limited confidence in the
economic case for operation.
You
can see the consultation documents at:-
http://www.environment.detr.gov.uk/consult/mox/sellafield/index.htm
DETR & DoH say they welcome comments on what BNFL
has said in its economic case, and MOX Market Review, including
comments from abroad. Comments should
reach them no later than 23 May.
You can send comments by post, fax or e-mail,
whichever you prefer to:-
Claire Herdman
Radioactive Substances Division
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
4/F6 Ashdown House
123 Victoria Street
London SW1E 6DE
fax: 020 7944 6340 e-mail: mox_consultation@detr.gsi.gov.uk
The issue is whether the manufacture by British Nuclear
Fuels plc (BNFL) of Mixed Oxide, plutonium, or MOX fuel is justified,
taking account of whether the benefits would outweigh the detriments.
As a result of the falsification of quality control data
in the MOX Demonstration Facility – and the resultant decline
in customer confidence, BNFL is now even less likely to generate
sufficient income to cover future costs than it was in July 1999,
let alone provide unquestionable economic advantage. As a result
of the events at the end of 1999, and the beginning of 2000, Ministers
decided that the economic case for SMP should be reviewed.
At the end of the 2000 BNFL informed the Government
that it was submitting a fresh business case to support the operation
of SMP, and a "commercial in confidence" version was
supplied in January 2001. BNFL provided a "public domain"
version in March 2001. It also provided an updated MOX market
review in March. The Government launched the 4th public
consultation exercise on SMP on 28th March 2001.
By constructing the MOX plant before seeking authorization,
the process of economically justifying the plant has become farcical.
BNFL is not even expected to cover the capital costs of the plant
– these costs are now considered to be ‘sunk’ – in other words
they will have been spent whether the plant is authorized or not.
For the 1999 Consultation exercise Ministers required BNFL to
provide “assurance that they can acquire sufficient business
to cover at least the plant’s commissioning, operating and decommissioning
costs”. Yet BNFL uses the fact that failure to authorize
the plant will require the capital costs to be written off as
part of its justification case.
“A decision
to deny approval for SMP would also require BNFL to write off
over £460M…”
Bearing in mind that BNFL and the Government appear to
be determined to ignore ‘sunk costs’ the key parameters which
will determine whether or not the benefits of authorizing SMP
will outweigh the disbenefits will be:-
(a)
The size of the ‘market’
for MOX,
(b)
SMP operational costs,
and
(c)
MOX fuel prices.
In
1999 BNFL estimated that in order to cover the future costs (commissioning,
operation and decommissioning) it would need to secure only 30-40%
of Japanese, German and Swiss sales within its ‘Reference Case’.
This has now been revised upwards to 40 – 50% of the Reference
Case.
In
1999, only 6.7% of the Reference Case had been secured as firm
contracts. In addition 11% of the Reference Case was covered by
‘letters of intent and reserved capacity’. By January 2001, the
proportion of the Reference Case contracted had risen slightly
to 9.6%. The proportion covered by letters of intent had also
risen slightly to 12.6%, taking the current proportion of the
Reference Case secured as either contracts or letters of intent
to 22.2%.
BNFL’s latest MOX Market Review examines the size of the MOX market in its
three main customer countries: Japan, Germany and Switzerland.
Japan
Assuming THORP reprocesses all the Japanese, German and
Swiss spent nuclear waste fuel for which it currently has contracts,
Japan will have 26.7 tonnes of plutonium at Sellafield, Germany
13.6 tonnes and Switzerland 4.2 tonnes. Converting this 44.6 tonnes
of plutonium into MOX is BNFL’s Reference Case. [With current
contracts standing at about 9.6% of the Reference Case, this represents
around 4.3 tonnes.] Japan, therefore, represents just over 60%
of BNFL’s Reference Case. If BNFL received contracts for all Swiss
and German plutonium, but no Japanese contracts, it would just
fail to reach the 40-50%
It rather boldly states that:-
“…Japan continues to represent a significant and robust market for BNFL’s
MOX fabrication services”.
It
continues by quoting from the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission’s
Long Term Plan that:
“Electric utilities plan to gradually increase the number of light water
reactor plants using MOX fuel to a total of from 16 to 18 by the
year 2010.”
As evidence
for this BNFL states that the first Japanese reactor planned to
be loaded with MOX, the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO’s)
Fukushima I-3 reactor site, now has all the necessary approvals
to load MOX. Whilst BNFL accepts that there may be some difficulties
with local political and public acceptance of MOX loading
“…a delay of several months or even around a year does not alter the conclusion
that SMP is economically justified”.
It
goes on to talk about the reactor intended to be second in line
for MOX loading and states simply that:-
“A second consignment of MOX fuel is currently en route to their Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
3 reactor”.
“…BNFL retains a high degree of confidence in securing a significant tranche
of MOX fabrication business from its existing Japanese reprocessing
customers”.
TEPCO announced on 29th March that it would not
load MOX fuel at Fukushima during the next scheduled outage. The
company said it had been unable to gain the understanding of the
local citizens. Governor Eisaku Sato of Fukushima has made it
clear since February that he wishes to take his time to deliberate
the pluthermal program and energy policy issues within the prefecture.
In an exclusive interview with the Asahi Newspaper on 28 March,
Governor Sato is quoted as saying, “a majority of the prefectural
citizens are against the (pluthermal) program.” He added, “the
examination (of energy policy) will take at least one year.
During that time there is no way I will allow the beginning
of the program.” The Governor said, “we will consider whether
a once-through cycle is possible.”
In his most concrete statement yet about the future of
the pluthermal program, Sato stated, “(the pluthermal freeze)
could last two or three years if we reach a conclusion that a
once-through cycle is better.”
In the meantime, Niigata Prefecture, which was scheduled to
be the second prefecture to load MOX fuel after Fukushima, continues
to object to being first. A
shipment of 28 MOX fuel assemblies arrived at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Nuclear Power Plant on 24th March.
However, the morning after residents of Kariwa-mura who
are opposed to the pluthermal program officially submitted a request
to Mayor Shinada to call for a referendum on the implementation
of MOX into the Unit 3 reactor.
The mayor must now comment on the request and send it to
the village assembly for debate within 20 days.
TEPCO’s hopes of loading MOX into
the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa reactor in Niigata soon are very slim.
The company has announced that it will not load the MOX on 17th
April as expected. The company says it will continue to make efforts to obtain
understanding from local residents and will decide whether to
use the MOX fuel by June.
In response to Tokyo Electric’s decision,
a Kyushu Electric executive stated in an article in the Nishi-Nippon
Shimbun that “it is difficult to think we will go before Tokyo
Electric.” His comments suggest that it is highly unlikely
that the company will follow through with its plans to begin MOX
fuel use in the Genkai Reactor by the originally planned 2004
implementation date.
In January, the Financial Times claimed
that, the then Energy Minister, Helen Liddell, had secured a statement
of intent from Japan, indicating that the Sellafield MOX Plant
could expect Japanese utilities to sign contracts for MOX.
However, Teruo Komatsu,
Manager, Energy Public Relations, Kansai Electric Power (KEPCO),
the recipient of the original flawed fuel from BNFL, insists
that KEPCO is not in any talks with BNFL about future contracts.
He told Aileen Mioko Smith of the Kyoto based, Green Action on
23rd January, that:-
"Absolutely nothing is proceeding on any contract negotiations
… The letter of intent stated that there has been no change in
plans concerning the use of MOX fuel [and] that it was appropriate
that SMP be opened in the near future. However, this was
only a generalization. It did not signify intent to sign
contracts. Nothing in the letter promised the signing of
contracts … There are absolutely no documents that exist that
state that we will promise that we will have fuel fabricated by
BNFL."
At a Press Briefing on 27th
February and at a subsequent briefing with media present on 2nd
April, KEPCO confirmed that it is conducting absolutely no negotiations
with BNFL concerning SMP MOX contracts. They also were clear
to state that there were no plans at present to do so. They also
confirmed that the letter described by the FT as a “statement
of intent” secured by Helen Liddell letter was not a commitment
by Japanese electric utilities whatsoever.
KEPCO also stated that, whilst the Overseas Reprocessing Committee
of Japanese utilities (ORC) may have said that it is desirable
for SMP to open, a prerequisite for using MOX in Japan is the
acceptance of Japanese citizens.
BNFL’s assertion that a delay of
one year in loading MOX into Japanese reactors does not undermine
its economic case is clearly wrong. The Fukushima re-examination
of energy policy, as the Governor states, might well come to the conclusion that a “once
through cycle” (ie. An end to reprocessing and the use of MOX)
is preferable to using MOX.
Germany
BNFL claims
that the recent German nuclear phase-out agreement between the
German Government and the nuclear utilities has clarified the
situation. The agreement allows the continuation of spent nuclear
waste fuel from Germany to Sellafield until June 2005.
German utilities are required to demonstrate a management
route for their separated plutonium in order to comply with the
German atomic law. This does not necessarily mean that they have
to purchase MOX. This highlights yet another failure of BNFL’s
economic case. It has failed to make any comparisons between MOX
and alternative options for the management of plutonium.
The German
Government is reported to be contributing $100m to the weapons
plutonium disposition programmes in Russia – but only for the
immobilization of plutonium as waste, not for converting it to
MOX fuel.
The suspension of work in the
U.S. on plutonium immobilization was also reported as being “unlikely
to sit well with the German government, which favours immobilization
as the best method of disposing of the excess weapons plutonium.
BNFL’s confidence in the market
opportunities in Germany may, therefore, be misplaced. As German
nuclear utilities have only waste management, decommissioning
and clean up work to look forward to, they no longer have a vested
interest in promoting the plutonium cycle. The evidence seems
to suggest that the current German Government is likely to push
utilities towards immobilization rather than MOX use. Whichever
nuclear company in Europe or elsewhere is able to offer a plutonium
immobilization service first, may find that it is still able to
scoop the bulk of business available from German utilities.
Switzerland
BNFL
claims it already has MOX fuel supply contracts with three out
of its four existing Swiss baseload reprocessing customers. With
only 4.2 tonnes of plutonium due to arise at Sellafield after
all Swiss spent fuel currently contracted has been reprocessed,
Switzerland represents only about 9.7% of the Reference Case,
and is therefore very minor.
Of
the 5 nuclear reactors in Switzerland, only three are expected
to load MOX. The other two, Leibstadt and Muehleberg are BWRs,
in which it is more difficult to use MOX. Goesgen has until now
bought. MOX exclusively from BNFL’s competitor, Belgonucleaire.
Goesgen is also known to have used MOX derived from plutonium,
which originated in either Leibstadt or Muehleberg. The other
two reactors Beznau I and II, have bought some MOX from BNFL and
some from Belgonucleaire.
BNFL
expresses concern about losing Swiss contracts if there is further
regulatory delay:-
“A contract with one Swiss customer has been amended to account for the
shortfall in capacity at Sellafield . A small quantity of fuel
will now be made by BNFL’s competitor in France. This does not
impact significantly on the overall economic case but demonstrates
the need for an early decision on SMP licensing”.
NOK is the
company that has recent switched a small order from BNFL to Belgonucleaire.
“ Furthermore, the customer has reserved capacity with BNFL’s competitor
in France as insurance against ongoing regulatory delays to SMP
in case existing contractual commitments cannot be fulfilled in
SMP”.
NOK is, therefore,
only one out of four of BNFL’s Swiss customers. Its two reactors
are small 380MW reactors. The four Swiss customers together represent
only about 9.7% of BNFL Reference Case or 4.4 tonnes of plutonium.
NOK, must own no more than about 1 – 2 tonnes of
plutonium, or no more than about 4.5% of the Reference
Case at the most. Despite the small size of these Swiss contracts
BNFL insist that:-
“…it
is vital that an early decision on SMP is achieved to avoid jeopardising
the Swiss contracts further”.
BNFL Chief Executive, Norman Askew
warned the Financial Times that BNFL’s Swiss customers would have
to buy Mox from a foreign competitor unless approval to start
production at the plant was granted in the next three months.
Members
of the Sort Out Sellafield campaign group, which includes MP Jack
Cunningham, have gone even further. The campaigners urged Energy
Minister, Peter Hain, "to grant BNFL a licence to run
the Cumbrian plant by July, otherwise it could lead to 800 job
losses and the loss of future contracts".
This is clearly pure hyperbole. The
tiny NOK contract or indeed any of the Swiss contracts should
not be used as an excuse for rushing a decision, which, if taken
now, would be a gamble that the market situation for MOX might
improve after the forthcoming year’s delay in loading MOX at Fukushima.
Sweden
Sweden has only around 1.4 tonnes
of plutonium at Sellafield.
“In Sweden,
BNFL anticipates supplying MOX fuel from SMP subject to a decision
by the Swedish Government on the granting of a MOX licence to
the reactor concerned”.
The
reactors concerned are at Oskarshamn, operated by OKG. This
company has 833 kilograms of plutonium at Sellafield. However,
this contract is by no means certain. Sweden continues to look
for alternatives to MOX according to the country’s environment
minister, who will not predict when a decision will be made. Environment
Minister Kjell Larsson said
“ We have a serious problem. We
have plutonium and we have to do something with it, but it’s not
so easy.”
Immediately following the MOX
data falsification scandal, Larsson said he did not want Sweden
dealing with BNFL and he has stuck to that position.
“… I am not especially happy about
manufacturing MOX at Sellafield,”
Larsson has not said what alternatives
are being considered. But one possibility is to fabricate the
MOX in Belgium or France instead of the U.K.
Cost Assumptions.
It is reasonable to assume that
the costs of uranium commissioning have been higher than expected.
Uranium commissioning was sanctioned by Ministers in June 1999.
This was expected to take less than 12 months, yet, as of April
2001, there has yet to be any confirmation that uranium commissioning
has been completed.
Future Reprocessing Contracts
BNFL claims that failure to
authorize SMP will jeopardize its chances of securing new reprocessing
contracts.
“Failure
to obtain approval for SMP is likely to severely damage BNFL’s
ability to secure further reprocessing and consequential MOX business
and hence valuable export earnings for the UK”.
The chances of BNFL securing
more reprocessing contracts must be slim. There is, however, a
question mark over whether in fact they should be seeking more
contracts.
In June 2000 at the Annual meeting
of the Ospar Convention for the protection of the marine environment
of the north-east Atlantic, a resolution was agreed by 13 of the
15 signatory states. The UK and France abstained. Ospar Decision
2000/1 calls for:-
“The current authorizations
for discharges or releases of radioactive substances from nuclear
reprocessing facilities [to] be reviewed as a matter of priority
by their competent national authorities with a view to inter alia:
implementing the non-reprocessing option (for example dry storage)
for spent nuclear fuel management at appropriate facilities …”
Germany and Switzerland were
amongst those countries ageing to this resolution.
The UK, however, by abstaining,
is not bound by this decision. It did, however, agree to a 1998
decision which was to:-
“By the year 2000 … work towards
achieving further substantial reductions or elimination of discharges,
emissions and losses of radioactive substances; [and] by the year
2020 … ensure that discharges, emissions and losses of radioactive
substances are reduced to levels where the additional concentrations
in the marine environment above historic levels, resulting from
such discharges, emissions and losses, are close to zero”.
The UK will not be living up
to the commitments made to OSPAR if the life of the THORP reprocessing
plant is extended.
MOX and Nuclear Proliferation.
The Environment Agency outlines its approach to justification
in its 1998 “Explanatory Memorandum for a Further Public Consultation
on the Application by BNFL for the Commissioning and Operation
of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant at its Sellafield Site in Cumbria”.
It states that all practices which give rose to radioactive waste
should be justified, ie. The benefits must outweigh the detriments
to society:-
“Detriments
are wider than the radiological detriment and include non-proliferation
and transport”
In its October 1998 decision document for the plutonium
commissioning of SMP, the Environment Agency states that:-
“In reaching
its proposed decision, the Agency has not taken any view on the
wider policy issues of plutonium management strategy. The Agency
is concerned about these wider policy issues and considers that
major developments at Sellafield are national and international
matters and that, given the significant political and economic
issues, relevant government departments should be involved in
considering the Agency’s proposed decision.”
The Agency goes on to warn that:-
“It would
be a relatively straightforward matter to undertake chemical separation
of plutonium from MOX fuel”.
The DTI claims that recovering plutonium from a MOX fuel
rod:-
“…would require
highly specialized plant, equipment and skills, and a considerable
degree of nuclear sophistication in order to ensure radiological
and criticality safety”.
Responding to this, Professor Frank Von Hippel, former
Assistant Director for National Security in the White House Office
of Science and Technology Policy points out that such an operation
could be carried out in a glove box with a filtered vent with
quantities of plutonium too small to result in a criticality accident.
A glove box is not an exotic piece of equipment – it can be homemade.
Information about the threshold at which plutonium in solution
could produce a criticality is widely and publicly available.
Clearly, there are disagreements amongst the experts
about the ease with which MOX fuel elements could be used to manufacture
a nuclear bomb. The DTI Safeguards Office in response to Von Hippel’s
remarks said:-
“…whilst
it would be technically feasible to recover plutonium from MOX
fuel and use this to make a nuclear weapon, the steps involved
would be non-trivial, requiring specialized skills and equipment
to ensure radiological and criticality safety”.
Authorising the Sellafield MOX plant to open could lead
to a massive increase in the number of shipments of MOX fuel around
the world. With a country like the United Kingdom beginning down
the plutonium fuel cycle road, it is bound to encourage others
to do the same, particularly Russia. Such a major step ought to
be open to much wider public scrutiny.
The DTI is the Government Department responsible for
ensuring that plutonium is safeguarded in the UK. However, the
DTI is the sponsoring department of BNFL. The DTI Safeguards Office
points out
“Decisions
regarding non-proliferation issues take into account input from
a number of sources – amongst others from DTI (including the Safeguards
Office), the Ministry of Defence, and the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office”.
Given that the Environment Agency has been unable to
assess the contribution to the detriment to society caused by
the proliferation risk involved in authorizing SMP, a Government
sponsored proliferation threat analysis should be published for
public scrutiny and peer review.
2.
MOX NEWS
March 28 2001 BNFL pressures government
over Sellafield review By Matthew Jones FINANCIAL TIMES
British Nuclear Fuels, the UK atomic services
group, said on Wednesday it would start losing customers for its
£460m ($653m)Sellafield Mox Plant in Cumbria unless the government
gave it approval for final commissioning by July.
Norman Askew, BNFL chief executive, said the group
had secured contracts for 22 per cent of the plant's capacity
and was confident that it could make money. [Actually they only
have contracts for 9.6%; you need to add ‘letters of intent’ to
bring the total to 22%]
However, he warned that the group's Swiss customers
would have to buy Mox from a foreign competitor unless approval
to start production at the plant was granted in the next three
months.
"I am not surprised that the government feels
it is right to have another public consultation but it would be
better if we could have a decision on a quicker timescale,"
said Mr Askew.
The future of the plant has been a source of tension
between Mr Meacher and ministers at the Department of Trade and
Industry, who have made efforts to restore BNFL's reputation with
foreign customers after the data falsification scandal.
DTI insiders argue that it is difficult for BNFL
to make a firm economic case for the plant because customers are
reluctant to commit to firm contracts until the plant has been
given the go-ahead. The DETR has countered that the plant needs
to pass a test of justification under European law.
BNFL claims about 1,800 jobs are dependent
on the Mox plant and failure to secure authorisation would also
cast doubt on the future of Thorp, the group's thermal oxide reprocessing
plant.
Earlier the FT in
“Review of nuclear plant to be held By Robert Shrimsley and Matthew
Jones (March 22 2001) said the authorisation is crucial to BNFL
winning vital fuel supply contracts from Japan. Those orders were
put in jeopardy last year after a scandal in which it was revealed
that BNFL had falsified safety records on fuel shipments to Japan.
BNFL has been working hard to secure new business ever
since. Until authorisation is granted, new contracts are unlikely to be
forthcoming. But Mr Meacher has been insisting on new orders before
approving the plant. Last month, local government officials in
Japan, BNFL's largest potential market for Mox, signalled a further
delay on contracts. The governor of Fukushima prefecture, which
was expected to be the first Japanese region to allow the use
of Mox fuel, called for a re-think on nuclear energy policy and
caution in using the fuel.
In January, BNFL
submitted a re-appraisal of the viability of the plant three years
after an independent economic review commissioned by the government
found it should go ahead.
The future of the
plant has been a source of tension between Mr Meacher and ministers
at the department of trade and industry. On Thursday, Stephen
Byers, trade and industry secretary, said he hoped an announcement
would be made "in the very near future". About 1,800
jobs are dependent on the Mox plant. Failure to secure authorisation
would also cast doubt on the future of Thorp, the group's thermal
oxide reprocessing plant.
MEACHER ANNOUNCES FURTHER CONSULTATION – BUT PROCEDURE
IS SUSPECT
(See DETR press release 28 March 2001).
Michael Meacher said "BNFL have now submitted
a revised economic case and it is right to give people a further
opportunity to comment.” But in a departure from accepted procedure,
he also announced that “Independent consultants are …being appointed
as a parallel procedure to evaluate the economic case put forward
by BNFL. The consultation will last 8 weeks and consultants will
report in around 10 weeks. The consultees will not therefore see
the consultants' report, but the consultants will take account
of the responses to the consultation exercise in reporting back
to the Departments”.
This appears to signal that Meacher has been pushed into speeding
up the consultation process. Consultees can normally expect to
see copies of any analysis submitted to the Government by consultants.
Greenpeace International Release.
TOKYO ELECTRIC AND BELGONUCLEAIRE REFUSAL TO RELEASE
PLUTONIUM DATA, "INEXPLICABLE" AND CRITICIZED BY COURT,
AS PLAINTIFFS INJUNCTION CLAIM TURNED DOWN
March 23rd
Tokyo/Fukushima
City…The Fukushima District Court announced today that plaintiffs
attempt to secure an injunction preventing Tokyo Electric
Power Company from loading plutonium Mixed Oxide fuel MOX),
into one of its nuclear reactor's, had been rejected. However,
the court also criticized as "inexplicable"
Tokyo Electric's attitude in not forcing the producers of the
MOX fuel, Belgonucleaire, to release quality control
data, demanded by the plaintiffs and requested by the court.
Throughout
the first half of 2000 the nuclear companies refused to release
data on the grounds of commercial confidentiality.
The plaintiffs, including members of Greenpeace, filed their case
in August 1999, submitting various statistical and
scientific papers as evidence. Over the next seven months Tokyo
Electric provided
little substantial evidence to counter the plaintiff group's claims.
Belgonucleaire, part of the Cogema dominated MOX group, COMMOX,
refused the court access to data which would, the plaintiffs
claim, would have shown manipulation of quality control data,
such as MOX pellet measurement size. The court itself
requested on several occasions the release of quality control
data, again without success. The case rested on the
plaintiffs proving conclusively falsification, which could only
be done comprehensively with the release of the data.
The court has said in its decision that with refusal to release
data it was not possible to conclusively prove falsification
and therefore the court could not make a judgement.
The Fukushima court in its decision today, stated
that claims by Belgonucleaire that pellet diameter data was
commercially confidential "was not credible". The plaintiffs
had cited the fact that British Nuclear
Fuels falsified
large numbers of pellet diameter data for MOX fuel produced for
Japan and delivered in 1999. The BNFL MOX is to be
shipped back to the UK. Because of doubts over the Fukushima MOX
fuel it has remained unused since 1999, and is stored at the Fukushima
nuclear power plant.
"The outcome of this case while not ideal, in no way let's
Tokyo Electric and Belgonucleaire/Cogema off the hook.
Clearly the court have been frustrated by the refusal of the nuclear
companies to release vital safety data. But its not
really inexplicable why they refuse - they know if they do we
will prove falsification as in 1999. Tokyo Electric,
and Cogema/Belgonucleaire know that to proceed with the loading
of MOX fuel which they have not proven as safe to use,
is to consciously conduct a dangerous plutonium experiment
on the people of Japan. The way forward for MOX use in Japan does
not exist," Kazue Suzuki of Greenpeace Japan and
one of the plaintiffs in the court case.
The falsification case against Tokyo Electric, Belgonucleaire
and Cogema came after an earlier scandal nvolving MOX
fuel manufactured by British Nuclear Fuels, BNFL. The company
admitted falsification of MOX
that was still in the UK, but denied that similar falsification
had occurred on earlier batch of MOX fuel then on board
the Pacific Pintail transport ship nearing Japan. BNFL had little
choice but to release substantial quality control data
before the vessel unloaded its cargo in Fukui Prefecture in western
Japan.
Immediately analyzed by three citizens groups, Greenpeace, Green
Action and Mihama-no Kai, it was bvious that falsification
of data had taken place. Only after three months of denials from
BNFL, the owners of the fuel Kansai Electric, and British
and Japanese government ministries, as well as a court challenge
by Green Action and Mihama-no-kai did BNFL admit falsification.
The decision by the court today was made only hours before another
cargo of plutonium MOX fuel is due to arrive in Niigata
Prefecture in west-central Japan. This shipment, consisting of
28 assemblies of MOX, also manufactured by Belgonucleaire/Cogema,
has also come under suspicion of falsification, and its
shipment and loading has been opposed by local and regional politicians
and citizens. As with the 1999 BNFL falsified MOX, the plutonium
cargo is on board the Pacific Pintail, escorted by the Pacific
Teal.
Both are armed
and are currently sitting off the coast of Japan, and are due
to dock early Saturday morning.
"Japan's plutonium program was in serious
crisis before today's decision. It still is. MOX fuel that costs
tens of millions dollars to manufacture and transport
to Japan, and at great threat to the environment and international
security is not safe to use in any Japanese reactor. The problem
for the nuclear industry is that MOX fuel is not and
cannot be manufactured to a high standard. Belgonucleaire, Cogema
and Tokyo Electric know this and that is why they refused
to release data on their production standards and quality control.
While the court has found their position inexplicable, the people
of Fukushima and the rest of Japan see it is totally unacceptable
- that means no MOX use," said Shaun Burnie of Greenpeace
International.
For further
information:
www.greenpeace.org/nuclear
Energy
Daily(Washington DCUSA) March 22, 2001 Disposal Facility By GEORGE
LOBSENZ
The National Nuclear Security Administration will scrap
fiscal year 2002 funding for a planned plutonium vitrification
facility in what could signal a major change in U.S. nuclear nonproliferation
policy. NNSA, a semi-autonomous agency within the Energy Department
that runs the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, said it would not
proceed next year with the design of the so-called immobilization
facility, which previously was seen as a key part of DOE's dual-track
program to dispose of surplus weapons plutonium.
NNSA indicated the decision was dictated by budget constraints,
and suggested the immobilization facility was being delayed, not
killed. It also said it is proceeding with the other track of
the plutonium disposal program, which calls for converting surplus
plutonium into mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel for commercial reactors.
"NNSA and DOE are in the midst of the budget cycle
for the new administration," NNSA said in a statement. "The
administration is looking at the budget and programs for the next
fiscal year and wants to assure the most effective use of monies
available. In this particular program we are continuing with the
MOX facility design and construction—but are opting to look at
other aspects, such as the immobilization facility, in possible
future budget cycles."
NNSA officials had no other details on budget considerations,
but other sources have said the agency is facing significant cuts
in its nonproliferation programs. However, some sources said the
budget cuts could provide a pretext for killing the immobilization
program and using existing DOE facilities to dispose of the plutonium
materials that are supposed to be vitrified. That would represent
a major departure from DOE's plutonium disposal program, as decided
upon by the department several years ago following an exhaustive
programmatic review. It also would deviate from the terms of a
U.S.-Russian agreement under which both countries agreed to use
both MOX fuel and immobilization to get rid of 50 tons of surplus
plutonium each.
The immobilization facility, to be built at DOE's Savannah
River Site in South Carolina, is supposed to prepare for disposal
17 metric tons of plutonium contained in scrap materials left
over from past nuclear weapons production. The materials are to
be vitrified into a glassified waste form, poured into cans and
then placed inside large canisters of high-level radioactive waste
for underground disposal. The vitrification process is aimed at
immobilizing the waste in a highly radioactive package so the
plutonium cannot leak into the environment or be recovered for
weapons use. The scrap material is considered unsuitable for conversion
into MOX fuel because the plutonium would have to undergo expensive
purification processes. In addition, Clinton administration officials
said immobilization was needed so the United States could have
a dual-track plutonium disposal strategy that assured there would
be a viable disposal method if one method or the other were to
run into technical problems.
Immobilization also has had strong support from antinuclear
groups who are opposed to MOX fuel because it would make commercial
use of weapons-usable plutonium, raising proliferation concerns.
Not surprisingly, those groups expressed alarm at NNSA's funding
decision.
"We are quite disturbed that they appear to be
defunding the immobilization program," said Tom Clements,
an official with the Nuclear Control Institute. "It's prudent
to keep this track open and operative."
However, immobilization has been viewed with suspicion
by some DOE officials who say existing nuclear reprocessing canyons
at Savannah River could be used to dispose of plutonium residues
without the expense and uncertainty of building the immobilization
facility.
Using the canyons could purify plutonium sufficiently
for it to be used in MOX fuel—and it would please South Carolina's
politically powerful congressional delegation, which wants to
keep the aging canyons running to maintain jobs. Using the canyons
also could reduce the cost and complexity of the MOX effort, which
is running into difficulty in developing plutonium purification
processes.
NRC considers plan to convert plutonium to reactor
fuel Reuters USA: April 4, 2001
by Scott DiSavino
NEW YORK - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
said it was considering an application for construction of a mixed
oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility at the Department of Energy's
Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina. The MOX facility
would convert surplus weapons-grade plutonium, supplied by the
Department of Energy, into fuel for use in commercial nuclear
reactors. Such use would render the plutonium essentially inaccessible
and unattractive for weapons use. Commercial nuclear power plants
in the United States currently use uranium as fuel; the mixed
oxide fuel would be a combination of uranium and plutonium.
The agency said in a statement
late Monday it will offer an opportunity for a hearing to persons
whose interests may be affected by this facility. The Department
of Energy announced plans to construct a MOX fuel plant through
a contract with the consortium of construction company Duke Engineering
& Services, a unit of energy giant Duke Energy Corp. of Raleigh,
N.C., French nuclear measurement company COGEMA Inc., and construction
company Stone & Webster. The consortium is known as DCS.
DCS submitted an environmental report on the MOX facility last
December, and requested authorization to construct the facility
in February. Before deciding whether to authorize construction,
the NRC will prepare an environmental impact statement and will
conduct a technical evaluation of the application to determine
whether it meets NRC requirements. The NRC said it will publish
soon in the Federal Register a notice for a hearing on the construction
of the MOX facility.
Nuclear Fuel 2nd April (TEPCO POSTPONES
LOADING MOX FUEL) said:-
Tepco’s decision to postpone the MOX loading at Fukushima
has thrown Japan’s MOX program into further confusion, as politicians
near other power plants that were supposed to follow Fukushima
I-3 in loading the newfuel objected to being first by default.
Governor Eisaku Sato of Fukushima prefecture told the Asahi newspaper
on March 28 that an ongoing examination of energy policy will
take at least a year, and “during that time there is no way I
will allow the beginning of the (MOX) program.” The policy examination
will consider “whether a once-through cycle is possible,” he said.
The decision came on the heels of a March 24 ruling
by the Fukushima District Court which dismissed a request by civic
groups for an injunction against loading of the MOX fuel, which
has been stored at the power plant for more than 18 months. The
opponents had charged that Tepco had failed to provide proof that
quality control by fabricator Belgonucleaire was reliable enough
to guarantee the MOX was free of defects. Tepco has declined to
ask Belgonucleaire to make public more data, despite repeated
requests from the court to do so.
The Fukushima court, though criticized the Belgian
manufacturer’s attitude. It also faulted Tepco for not trying
hard enough to get Belgonucleaire “to reconsider its obstinate
position and make the company’s random sampling inspection data
public,” saying Tepco had not taken “necessary sufficient action”
to provide the public with information relevant to nuclear plant
safety. Plaintiffs in the case, which include Greenpeace and the
local group Green Action, expressed disappointment with the ruling
but said they were still happy because the court supported their
viewpoint on data disclosure.
3. Phoenix News
Oral Questions to the Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry in the House of Commons, 22 March
2001
Nuclear Power
2. Mr. Michael Jack (Fylde): If
he will make a statement on the role of the nuclear industry in
helping to meet Britain's future electricity generation requirements.
[153629]
The Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry (Mr. Stephen Byers): The nuclear industry's role
will depend on its cost compared with that of other generation
options and on securing public confidence in respect of issues
such as safety and the environment. The generators have said that
they have no current plans for new nuclear power stations.
Mr. Jack: The Secretary of State
will be aware of the commitment to the industry of nuclear workers
in my constituency and their awareness of the industry's contribution
to meeting our Kyoto target and giving us security of energy supply.
In light of recent press reports of the wish of British Energy
and BNFL to investigate further investment in nuclear energy,
will he say what is the Government's strategic vision for the
industry? Will he support both companies' endeavours to renew
our rapidly ageing stock of nuclear power stations?
Mr. Byers: The right hon. Gentleman
refers to the press reports about comments allegedly made by British
Energy and BNFL. Both companies have denied that they have any
proposals at present to begin a new generation of nuclear power
stations. Springfields, the facility in his constituency, is a
major employer, and he is rightly concerned about the implications
of the decline of Magnox in the next few years and its impact
on his constituents.
It will be another five years
or so before the Magnox fuel demands at Springfields will be in
decline, so we have time to work out together the new role that
Springfields can play. I believe that it can remain a vibrant
manufacturing facility, employing many people. I want to work
with the right hon. Gentleman and BNFL to make sure that the expertise
and talent at Springfields can be used in future, perhaps in a
slightly different way. There is huge potential at that facility,
and we have time to map out a way to ensure that it can be used
to the full.
Mr. David Drew (Stroud): Does
my right hon. Friend agree that the nuclear industry's importance
lies in the people in that industry, and that without clear and
coherent policies we shall not attract into the industry the younger
people we need not only to develop new generation potential, but
to manage safety issues, which must always be uppermost in our
mind?
Mr. Byers: My hon. Friend is right.
We have to ensure that public confidence in nuclear is retained,
so we need to explain the benefits that can be derived from nuclear
as well as the safety measures that are in place. Nuclear accounts
for 23 per cent. of electricity production; even given the projected
decline, in 10 years it will still account for 18 per cent. of
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