Puzzle over plant's future Sellafield's Thorp reprocessing operation, once hailed as the saviour of the British nuclear industry with its promise of producing limitless electricity throughout the 21st century, may close by 2010. Although BNFL later played this report down, it is known that:

1 Existing 'baseload' (first 10 years) reprocessing contracts should be completed in 2006, and there are doubts about the few surviving 'post baseload' contracts.
2 No further contracts are being sought.
3 The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority takes over Sellafield in 2005 so any Thorp closure decision would not be for BNFL.
Brian Watson, director of the Sellafield site, told the Guardian (26/8/03)
The company was changing from production into a nuclear waste disposal company. "There is £30bn worth of clean up work here. We are switching from reprocessing to clean-up. We hope that will be seen in a more positive light."
Reprocessing was the nuclear dream. Now there is 75 tonnes of plutonium and 3,336 tonnes of uranium recovered from reprocessing, all stored and closely guarded but with no obvious use, at Sellafield.
BNFL is being changed from the owner of Sellafield into a management company since it became technically bankrupt two years ago with liabilities now estimated at £41bn. The government is creating a nuclear decommissioning authority to take over the assets and liabilities. Thorp was supposed to reprocess 7,000 tonnes of spent fuel in 10 years but it is years late on its target and is being run at about 50% of capacity.

This is because the dangerous liquid waste produced by reprocessing cannot be disposed of fast enough to satisfy the government's safety regulators. A Nuclear Installations Inspectorate report, published in June stated: "The site vitrification performance ... means that Oxide fuel reprocessing will continue to be significantly constrained for the foreseeable future by vitrification throughput."

It was announced in July that Thorp may take an extra three years to complete its existing reprocessing contracts. In its best year, 1999-2000, Thorp's throughput was 890 tonnes. However, this fell to 362 tonnes the following year and was just 502 tonnes last year. In March at the end of its ninth year it still had 2,626 tonnes to go.

This year BNFL has set a target output of 671 tonnes, though Thorp has rarely met its output targets. Even if it is successful, there will still be 1,955 tonnes of waste left to reprocess at the end of March, around three years' work.

Thorp was designed with a nominal capacity of 12,000 tonnes over a ten year period. BNFL decided that the plant would only be called upon to reprocess 6,000 tonnes in the first decade. (Harold Bolter, 'Inside Sellafield' - 1996. P75)

In the late 1980's 'in order to placate its overseas customers' BNFL announced that it would be treated as a plant with a working capacity of 7,000 tonnes over the first ten years.

When BNFL built Thorp, it predicted it would make a £500m profit on its reprocessing deals, but this has been eaten up by the extra vitrification line and increased running costs at Thorp.

Now BNFL is facing large losses as it renegotiates the deals it has with its customers. The Germans, in particular, are understood to be keen to negotiate a discount on their £1.2bn contract with BNFL, which covers the reprocessing of spent fuel from its reactors and the purchase of Mixed Oxide Fuel from the £470m MOX plant built next to Thorp at Sellafield.

Vitrification - the truth
"Very Good Year - Vitrification plants celebrate as they exceed their performance targets" (Sellafield newsletter - Focus - March 2003)

Watson has now conceded that the vitrification plants continuously broke down, mainly because the high levels of radiation destroyed the electrical cables and other machinery needed to operate them. The plant was designed with two production lines to produce 600 glass blocks a year - enough to make safe 50 years of highly dangerous liquid waste. These tanks contain the highest level of radioactivity of any plant in Europe.
A third line has been built, and the current target is for all three lines together to produce 500 blocks a year. (In the last year total production was 324 blocks, incl 83 by line 3)

Magnox fuel has to be reprocessed through the dilapidated B205 plant built in 1965. To cope with the remaining throughput from the magnox stations, it will stay open until 2012. The only manufacturing left on the site when reprocessing goes will be the plant for making nuclear fuel from plutonium and uranium oxides. The MOX plant, opened only last year, takes plutonium from the Thorp plant, but Mr Watson says it can remain open using some of the 75 tonnes of plutonium stored on site.

"Ideally, I would like to build a plutonium-burning reactor and use the MOX plant to make the fuel. The rest of the site could then be devoted to cleaning up the mess of the cold war. But these are political decisions," he said.

WANA Comment:
A further 14,000 tonnes of spent fuel, most of it from abroad, were intended to be reprocessed at Thorp in its second and third decades. It is a measure of the failure of the plant that it will take at least an extra three years to finish the first decades (baseload) contracts. Then it has only smaller volume German and British Energy post-baseload business in prospect.

The NDA may consider stopping reprocessing at THORP even earlier than 2010 because of uncertainties about these orders.

The rationale for reprocessing had already vanished before the plant started up in 1994. Even 'insiders' regarded Thorp as 'spherically daft' (daft from whichever way you look at it.) WANA has never campaigned for the closure of the Sellafield site. It hosts a huge concentration of radioactivity and the legacy of fifty years of contamination. With the setting up of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, there is a real opportunity to clean up this mess.

It is the stated objective of the UK strategy for radioactive discharges 2001-2020 to implement the UK's obligations in respect of the OSPAR strategy rigorously and transparently.

Discharges must now be brought down in line with this objective rather than the significant increases currently projected until 2011.

Wylfa in trouble again As BNFL prepare the 'safety case' to operate Wylfa beyond 2004, further weld defects have been discovered during the reactor 1 outage, which started on May 9th.

These are different defects from those picked up in April 2000 in the superheater penetration welds, but are in the same region of the reactor at the top of the steam generators.

Unlike the superheater pipes which were braced from the outside of the reactors, the new defects are in brackets which support steam pipes inside the reactors and require considerably more difficult and arduous welding to be carried out. This latest type of defect was apparently not anticipated before May 9th despite the fact that a huge increase in staff has occurred during the planned outage of Wylfa R1. Almost 1000 people are on site undertaking the outage and shutdown work. (Wylfa News, 12/5/03)

In addition to carrying out maintenance work identified during the last few years, they will inspect and collect samples in order to conduct the periodic safety review (PSR).

The NII has confirmed that any increase in radiation exposure of station staff has to be justified in terms of the net benefit of longer term plant operations.

Wylfa is fast running out of time. The NII expect the PSR documentation from BNFL this September. They then have a year in which to assess it, and decide whether the case for continued operation has been made or not.

There goes the environment
The prolonged heat wave is having a profound effect on France as inland nuclear power stations use river water to convert the steam generated back to water. This is particularly critical where a number of reactors use the same river, such as the Rhône. As the flow in the river decreases, and the river temperature rises, the coolant water put back into the river is discharged at a higher temperature.
This has a bad effect on river ecology and means that the power stations downstream cannot work efficiently because their coolant water arrives too hot.

Ecological monitoring on the effect of the warming of the high Rhône at the level of the Bugey nuclear power station gives clear evidence of the impact of the warming on aquatic life: up to 15°C, the fish progressively leave the margins, up to 25°C the larger river creatures desert the zone and up to 29°C the collapse of whole populations occurs. After four years of allowing exception after exception to help out EdF (the current norms are themselves already exceptions) the French Environment Ministry has given consent for discharges up to 29°C.
Source: Le Réseau " Sortir du nucléaire "

There goes the grid
No sooner had the Aug 14th blackouts been reported than pro-nuclear commentators popped out of the woodwork. The deregulation of electricity markets may indeed have contributed to system vulnerability, by cutting down on idling plant, known as 'spinning reserve'. But hopes that increased electricity prices will allow new nuclear power stations to become more cost effective are deluded. They still don't get the point. More nukes would not make the system more robust but perpetuate its vulnerability to breakdowns as well as terrorism.

AlQuaeda is even rumoured to be behind the North American blackouts.The growing dependence on larger and larger generating units over the last four or five decades has made US and UK electricity distribution system more vulnerable to breakdowns. The UK Government's Energy White Paper claims (para 6.4) that our energy system has proved robust, yet this is in the context of 'weather related economic losses to communities and businesses (that) have increased ten-fold over the last 40 years'. (para 1.7)A truly robust energy system would employ 'micro CHP' with gas-fired domestic and commercial boilers generating their own electricity. As central heating boilers are replaced on average every 15 years, and the contribution that they could make to electricity supply is over 40 GW, it was curious how the Energy White Paper played them down. The true benefits of electricity supplied by renewable sources are not confined to their non-carbon emitting characteristics but stem from their small size, their geographical spread, and their modular nature. These sources will, in the long term, prove more resilient as well as being more affordable, less complex and having shorter lead times.

Trawsfynydd Decision Flunked by Assembly
WANA has welcomed the decision to give approval for the construction of a purpose built store for intermediate level radioactive waste on the Trawsfynydd site. However, WANA views with great concern the decision to allow the construction of a new roof over the reactors which would place an unnecessary obstacle in the way of earlier decommissioning.

At last November's Trawsfynydd public inquiry WANA had quoted Michael Barnes, the Hinkley Point C Inspector who remarked:
"...there is a strong case for a greater measure of protection of the interests of the public in the main decisions on decommissioning, particularly its timing, over and beyond that provided by the NII (whose jurisdiction is confined to safety considerations)" At the Trawsfynydd Inquiry both Magnox Electric and the NII were keen to put the planning system in its place:

BNFL stated that: The planning application can be determined without consideration of wider issues relevant to decommissioning nuclear power stations because it should be assumed that other regulatory regimes will operate satisfactorily. (para 28)

The HSE/NII similarly stated that: Planning Authorities should operate on the basis that the pollutant control regimes will be enforced. They should not concern themselves with the timing of reactor dismantling, or with the merits or demerits of Government policy. It is accepted that there are large areas of policy to be settled, but there are separate processes of deliberation to decide these. (para 84)

The Inspector duly obliged, recommending that consent be given. The Assembly's 'planning decision committee' could have asserted an overarching commitment to its sustainable development principles, split the decision and rejected the 'height reduction' part of the application. But it didn't.

It was unwise for the National Assembly's Planning Decision Committee to give the go ahead for a £70 million facelift for 40 year old reactor buildings which on safety grounds should be dismantled within 20 years. It would be disastrous if this public money is spent on such a silly project when there is a serious and demanding task ahead.

According to the HSE/NII 'the creation of the liabilities management authority resolves concerns about future resources for the decommissioning of nuclear sites.' (para 87)

The Nuclear Installation Inspectorate has confirmed that there is little benefit in delaying the decommissioning of the Trawsfynydd reactors beyond 30 years after their 1991 shutdown.
Some good came out of the Inquiry, in particular the Assessor's Report. This confirmed that the rationale for a 100 year deferral period for Stage 3 decommissioning did not stand up to scrutiny. Arguments that reductions in worker dose rate would allow manual working were rejected. If, because of shortcomings in the planning process, the National Assembly's cannot protect the public's interest in securing earlier decommissioning of Trawsfynydd, then WANA will turn its attention to the Nuclear Installation Inspectorate who claimed their Quinquennial Review of BNFL's generic strategy for decommissioning its nuclear sites was a powerful mechanism to secure early decommissioning. Their promise of 'more extensive consultation' is accepted in good faith, but it will require regulatory consistency to convince the communities around decommissioning sites that they mean business. It is inconsistent to seek passive safety for the operational radioactive waste, but to leave the radioactive contents of the reactors to deteriorate indefinitely simply because there is no 'national repository' for ILW. The HSE's Quinquennial Review of BNFL's generic strategy for decommissioning its nuclear sites is a powerful mechanism to secure continuing improvement and early decommissioning from the licensee. The HSE envisages more extensive consultation with interested parties in the future. (para 89)

The reduced height reactor buildings are capable of being made passively safe. (paras 85-86)

Comments and Extracts from the Inspector's report and the Assessor's report
The inspector's conclusions The ILW store and the alteration to the reactor buildings are an 'integrated design', so a 'split decision' should be avoided. (C9) The form and function of the proposed development relate to UK-wide decisions on radioactive waste that have yet to be taken. (C10)

The benefits of reconfiguring the reactor buildings (even if only for a short period) outweigh the alternative of a continuation of the present structure for decades. Early dismantling of the reactor buildings in advance of a national repository may necessitate building a second (probably very large) ILW store on the site whose environmental impact... is unlikely in my view to be beneficial. (C20)

The ILW store is a temporary building which should not be permitted to remain longer than it is needed and should, when dismantled be followed by full site restoration. Similar conditions cannot be placed on the "permanent" reactor buildings. (C27-C29)

By overturning the inspectors recommendation on a time limit for the ILW store the National Assembly Planning Decision Committee (para 10 of decision letter) may have established by default a permanent radioactive waste dump at Trawsfynydd.

The assessor's report
Considers issues not necessarily 'determinative' of the planning application 'that may be of wider interest to decision makers.' Woollam of BNFL argued that it was the extra cost associated with the need to make greater use of remote dismantling techniques at earlier times that was a primary reason to delay dismantling. The NII indicated that they would require remote dismantling even after 100 years delay. Thus arguments based on worker dose rate alone do not provide sufficient rationale for a 100 year deferral period for Stage 3 decommissioning. (AR 48)

The NII's QQR process has influenced the thinking of the licensees on the timing of Stage 3 decommissioning. 'However there has been no formal opportunity within the QQR process for other stakeholders to express a view, either to the licensee or to the NII'. To help clarify matters at future public inquiries a period of public comment on the licensee's submissions and/or a period of public consultation on an initial draft report by the NII, is suggested. "It is important for decision makers and the public to understand why strategy in other countries should favour significantly earlier decommissioning than in the UK." (AR 49ii)
"..it was clear that the meaning of intergenerational equity as applied to reactor decommissioning, and the relative weight to be given to this issue need further strategic thinking and consultation as part of the development of national strategy on decommissioning" (AR 49iii)

The assumption of a 2.5% real growth rate for funds...... "places a burden on future generations to ensure that funds invested today grow at a sufficient rate. Furthermore, the lack of a segregated fund for decommissioning Magnox reactors, as at present, means that in practice, most of the required funding will likely be borne by taxpayers in the future." It is questionable whether these circumstances "satisfy the principles of intergenerational equity and sustainable development." (AR 49iv)
"The main environmental issue associated with the reactor buildings is whether the radioactive materials it contains (the boiler systems, the biological shield, the reactor pressure vessel) can be said to be in a passively safe state. This is an issue under discussion between the Applicant and the NII." (AR54)

"Construction and operational difficulties could lead to the reduced height safestores being more difficult to manage during the Care and Maintenance phase than if the roof height was not reduced." (AR 63ii)

"Although national radioactive waste management policy is currently in a state of turmoil, this decision is unlikely to undermine or run counter to national policy..." (AR68)

"Further work is needed to define what is meant by passive safety for any extended Care and Maintenance phase..." (AR 71iii)

Amen CORWM Chair lands, by parachute
On July 16th Katharine Bryan was appointed to chair the new Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM). CoRWM will be responsible for recommending to Government, under its "Managing Radioactive Waste Safely" programme, how best to manage the UK's higher activity radioactive waste in the long term. CoRWM's recommendations will be forwarded to the Government around 2006. A surprising aspect of the appointment is that Bryan suddenly arrived at a time when a short list of three men, including John Large, were to meet the Environment minister. That meeting did not take place.

Katharine Bryan has been Chair of the Joint Nature Conservation Committee, the Government's wildlife advisory body, since October 2002. Before that she was Chief Executive of the North of Scotland Water Authority. She previously held senior posts in the Environment Agency and its predecessors.

Yes to Wind
A comprehensive new opinion poll released by the Scottish Executive on Aug 24th shows overwhelming support for wind power. Four out of five people living within 20km of one of Scotland's 10 wind farms said it had caused no problems. The closer they live to the wind machines, the more positive they think their impact has been. Sir Bernard Ingham of 'Country Guardians' and 'Supporters Of Nuclear Energy said: "Scotland is barmy. But there again, what would you expect."

Published by WANA PO Box 1 Llandrindod Wells LD1 5AA
Tel: 01982 570362
Email: hughrichards@gn.apc.org
http://www.kare-uk.org/wana-index.htm

Hugh Richards
Welsh Anti Nuclear Alliance
PO Box 1
Llandrindod Wells
Powys LD1 5AA

Tel/Fax: 01982 570362
Email: hughrichards@gn.apc.org